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Choice of Law for Unjust Enrichment/Restitution and the Rome II Regulation  
Adeline Chong* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
After being considered as niche territory for a long period,1 conflicts of law and restitution has 
provided a fertile ground for exposition in recent times.2 Whilst some development on the 
jurisdictional front has occurred,3 choice of law has lagged behind somewhat as, in England at 
least, no one seemed to be quite sure what was or should be the choice of law rule for 
restitutionary claims.4 However, the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (commonly known as the Rome II Regulation) 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management University. I would like to thank Prof. James 
Fawcett for comments on an earlier draft of this article and Veronika Gaertner for her advice on civil law 
systems. All errors remain my own. The genesis of this paper is a paper that was presented at the Law of 
Obligations III Conference : Justifying Remedies in the Law of Obligations, T.C. Beirne School of Law, 
University of Queensland, July 2006. I am grateful to the British Academy for providing funding for me to 
participate in that conference.  
1 Examples of the older literature include : JG Collier, ‘The Draft Convention and Restitution or Quasi-
Contract’ in K Lipstein, Harmonisation of Private International Law by the EEC (London : Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies) (1978); K Zweigert and D Müller-Gindullis, ‘Quasi-Contract’ in K Lipstein (ed), 
International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Vol. III (The Hague : Tübingen) (1974); S Cohen, 
‘Quasi Contract and the Conflict of Laws’ (1956) 31 LA Bar Bull 71; A Ehrenzweig, ‘Restitution in the 
Conflict of Laws : Law and Reason Versus the Restatement Second’ (1961) 36 NYLR 1298, HC Gutteridge 
and K Lipstein, ‘Conflict of Law in Matters of Unjustifiable Enrichment’ (1939) 7 Camb. LJ 80.  
2 E.g. G Panagopoulos, Restitution in Private International Law (Oxford : Hart Publishing) (2000); F Rose 
(ed.), Restitution and the Conflict of Laws (Oxford : Mansfield Press) (1995); TW Bennett, ‘Choice of Law 
Rules in Claims of Unjust Enrichment’ (1990) 39 ICLQ 136; J Blaikie, ‘Unjust Enrichment in the Conflict 
of Laws’ [1984] Jur. Rev. 112; S Lee, ‘Choice of Law for Claims in Unjust Enrichment’ (2002) 26 MULR 
192; S Lee, ‘Restitution, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws’ (1998) 20 UQLJ 1; R Leslie, ‘Unjustified 
Enrichment in the Conflict of Laws’ (1998) 2 Edinburgh LR 233; R Stevens, ‘Restitution and the Rome 
Convention’ (1997) 113 LQR 249; A Dickinson, ‘Restitution and Incapacity : A Choice of Law Solution?’ 
(1997) 5 RLR 66; A Dickinson, ‘Restitution and the Conflict of Laws’ [1996] LMCLQ 556, J Bird, ‘Choice 
of Law and Restitution of Benefits Conferred Under a Void Contract’ [1997] LMCLQ 182; J Bird, ‘Choice 
of Law Rule for Priority Disputes in Relation to Shares’ [1996] LMCLQ 57; J Bird, ‘Bribes, Restitution and 
the Conflict of Laws’ [1995] LMCLQ 198. 
3 A new ground for service out of jurisdiction was introduced for restitutionary claims in CPR Rule 
6.20(15). However, the Brussels I Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters [2001] OJ L12/1 does not contain a rule dealing specifically with restitution. 
4 The restitutionary choice of law rule set out in editions of Dicey, Morris and Collins has always been 
prefaced with the word semble. Cf. Scotland : Baring Brothers v. Cunninghame District Council [1997] 
CLC 108. 
  2 
has now entered into force and will apply from 11 January 2009.5 Article 10 of the Rome II 
Regulation sets out a choice of law rule for unjust enrichment. 
 This article will focus on Article 10 and consider how well the Rome II Regulation caters 
for choice of law for restitution. Reference will be made to approaches that are or were taken in 
individual Member States and other countries in order to lay out the background in this area.6 The 
structure of this paper will be as follows. The first question that is dealt with is whether the 
appropriate terminology was adopted by Article 10 : should it be choice of law for ‘unjust 
enrichment’ or choice of law for ‘restitution’? Secondly, Article 10 adopts the framework of 
several rules pointing towards different connecting factors. These various specific choice of law 
rules will be considered in terms of their appropriateness and hierarchy towards each other. 
Thirdly, some specific problems concerning restitution for wrongs, proprietary restitution and 
renvoi will be examined.  
 
II. A QUESTION OF TERMINOLOGY : CHOICE OF LAW FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
VERSUS CHOICE OF LAW FOR RESTITUTION 
 
One of the first issues that needs to be made clear is the correct label to be attached to the choice 
of law rules – are they choice of law rules for ‘unjust enrichment’ or choice of law rules for 
‘restitution’? For example, Dicey, Morris and Collins’s Rule 230 appears in the chapter entitled 
‘Restitution’ but from the language used it is clearly concerned specifically with claims arising to 
reverse unjust enrichment.7 Similarly, § 221 of the Restatement (Second) on Conflict of Laws 
covers ‘actions for restitution’ but goes on to emphasise elements relating to the ‘enrichment’ as 
                                                 
5 [2007] OJ L199/40. 
6 Especially German law (which is known to have a well-established domestic law of unjustified 
enrichment); Swiss law (which was looked at when the unjust enrichment choice of law provision in Rome 
II was being drafted; see Explanatory Memorandum, COM (2003) 427 final, at 22); and US law (which 
clarifies the common law approach.  
7 L Collins (gen. ed), Dicey, Morris and Collins : The Conflict of Laws (London : Sweet & Maxwell) (14th 
edn, 2006); hereafter Dicey, Morris and Collins.  
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contacts to be considered when deriving the applicable law.8 Article 10 of the Rome II 
Regulation, on the other hand, is headed ‘Unjust enrichment’. 
 This issue raises a question of characterisation and the correct label to be attached to the 
characterisation category. An analysis of a few different domestic systems of restitution will be 
looked at, followed by a study of the various arguments for and against either label. 
 
(A) Comparative domestic laws of restitution 
  
It is never a good idea to be overly dependent on domestic requirements and classifications for 
conflicts purposes,9 but a quick overview of the state of the English domestic law of restitution 
would give a good idea of the hurdles faced at the conflicts level.10 It is trite law that restitution is 
now no longer subsumed under the label of ‘quasi-contract’11 but is instead recognised as being a 
separate branch of law.12 That much is clear; the rest is regrettably murkier. The main problem in 
the domestic law of restitution that also impinges at the choice of law level is the uncertainty 
concerning its scope and taxonomy.13 Three different types of claims could be said to fall within 
the rubric of the ‘law of restitution’ under domestic law. First are claims relating to the 
conferment of a benefit to the defendant; examples being a claim for money had and received and 
a quantum meruit14claim. Second would be actions which seek to prevent a wrongdoer from 
profiting from his or her wrong, such as an action for an account of profits pursuant to a breach of 
                                                 
8 § 221(2). 
9 Re Bonacina [1912] 2 Ch 394. 
10 This must necessarily be a gross simplification of the complicated debates taking place between 
restitutionary scholars. 
11 A misunderstanding that the word ‘quasi’ meant ‘sort of contractual’ (instead of ‘not contractual’) led to 
restitutionary actions being thought as based on an implied promise of the recipient to return the 
enrichment : P Millett, ‘Proprietary Restitution’ in S Degeling and J Edelman, Equity in Commercial Law 
(Sydney : Lawbook Co.) (2005), p. 313.  
12 Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale [1991] AC 548. 
13 In relation to Rule 230, the commentary in Dicey, Morris and Collins states that : ‘In some ways, the 
definition of the territory governed by this Rule is the most difficult aspect of choice of law for restitution’ 
(n 7 above, para. 34-005, p. 1865). 
14 A claim for reasonable payment for goods supplied or services rendered. 
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fiduciary duty. The third potential type of claim would be founded upon property rights; for 
example, a claim that money paid over pursuant to a mistake is impressed with a constructive 
trust. The first type of claim is universally recognised as being based on the reversal of unjust 
enrichment. The other two, which can be referred to as restitution for wrongs and proprietary 
restitution respectively, have a more cloudy basis. The question is whether these two latter forms 
of claims are also based on the principle of unjust enrichment.15 There are advocates on each side 
of the fence.16 On the one hand, the quadrationists hold the view that restitution is only ever about 
reversing unjust enrichment, whilst on the other hand, the multi-causalists argue that restitution 
can arise from a number of events, one of which is unjust enrichment.17 So for example, whilst 
quadrationists argue that the cause of action for restitution for wrongs is still unjust enrichment,18 
the multi-causalists argue that the cause of action is the wrong itself.19 
A look at how other jurisdictions handle the same issues of taxonomy and role to be 
played by the unjust enrichment principle might help illuminate matters. After all, the law of 
obligations in civil law systems has long recognised a right to restitution on the basis of unjust 
enrichment20 and the American Law Institute published the Restatement of the Law of Restitution 
                                                 
15 Some go further and question whether there is even a category of proprietary restitution : Lord Goff and 
G Jones, Goff & Jones : The Law of Restitution (London : Sweet & Maxwell) (7th edn, 2007), para. 1-011, 
p. 12; para. 2-007, p. 92. Cf. NABB Brothers Ltd v. Lloyd’s Bank International (Guernsey) Ltd [2005] 
EWHC 405, [2005] ILPr 37, paras. [76]-[77].  
16 Disparate views on the taxonomy of the law of restitution and the role to be played by the unjust 
enrichment principle can be found in e.g. P Birks, Unjust Enrichment (Oxford : OUP) (2nd edn, 2005); A 
Burrows, The Law of Restitution (London : Butterworths) (2nd edn, 2002); S Hedley, A Critical 
Introduction to Restitution (London : Butterworths) (2001); G. Virgo, The Principles of the Law of 
Restitution (Oxford : OUP) (2nd edn, 2006); J. Edelman, Gain-Based Damages (Oxford : Hart Publishing) 
(2002). 
17 See Birks, ‘Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment’ (2001) 79 Texas L.R. 1767 for a useful 
exposition on the schism between these two camps. 
18 E.g. Burrows, n 16 above, pp. 5-7. Birks was originally of this view too but later changed his mind : see 
An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (revised edition) (Oxford : Clarendon Press) (1989), p. 26 and 
later, ‘Misnomer’ in WR Cornish, R Nolan, J O’Sullivan and G Virgo (eds), Restitution : Past, Present and 
Future, pp. 14-15 and Unjust Enrichment (2nd edn), n 16 above, pp.12-16. 
19 E.g. Virgo, n. 16 above, pp. 9-10, 425-428. 
20 B Dickson, ‘Unjust Enrichment Claims : A Comparative Overview (1995) 54 CLJ 100.  
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in 1937. In contrast, unjust enrichment was only recognised as being part of English law in 
1991.21 
The role to be played by the unjust enrichment principle appears clearer under US law. 
The draft of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment classifies restitution of 
profits from a wrongful act as being based on unjust enrichment.22 The draft Restatement also 
recognises that restitution has a role to play in vindicating a claimant’s proprietary rights.23 
Therefore, proprietary remedies such as a constructive trust,24 subrogation and equitable lien are 
considered to be examples of remedies preventing the unjust enrichment of the claimant.  
What about our continental cousins? It used to be said that a continental lawyer might 
regard himself as ‘entering another world’25 when approaching the common law conceptions of 
restitution but this may no longer be quite true.26 For example, the German law of unjustified 
enrichment can be divided into two main categories : Leistungskondiktionen and 
Eingriffskondiktionen.27 The former covers claims based on a transfer; for example a loan 
contract that is rescinded by the bank on the grounds of fraud.28 The latter is based on 
encroachment by the defendant, such as where a person lets his cattle graze in someone else’s 
                                                 
21 Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548. Although see Virgo, n. 16 above, p. 13 and in 
‘Reconstructing the Law of Restitution’ (1996) 10 Trust Law International 20 at 23-24, who argues that the 
case paradoxically was not truly concerned with unjust enrichment.  
22 See Chapter 5. Note that the drafters prefer the term ‘unjustified enrichment’ as being the more accurate 
label for enrichment that lacks a legal basis than the open-ended connotations of ‘unjust enrichment’ : §1, 
comment b. All references to the draft Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment are based 
on the draft that is current through March 2008 and can be found on Westlaw. 
23 See § 4, comment and provisional (and informal) reporter’s note.  
24 US law recognises the remedial constructive trust which could arise in response to unjust enrichment. 
See § 160 of the Restatement of the Law of Restitution (1937). (Although the remedial constructive trust 
could be imposed even where there has been no unjust enrichment : Korkontzilas v. Soulos (1997) 146 
DLR (4th) 214.) English law has yet to adopt this type of constructive trust : Re Polly Peck International plc 
(in administration) (No. 2) [1998] 3 All ER 812. 
25 K Zweigert and H Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, Vol. II : The Institutions of Private Law  
(Oxford : North-Holland Publishing Co.) (1977), p. 235.  
26 K Zweigert and H Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd edn, 1998) (Oxford : Clarendon Press), 
p. 551. 
27 Some German scholars put forward more than two categories : see R Zimmermann and J du Plessis, 
‘Basic Features of the German Law of Unjustified Enrichment’ (1994) 2 RLR 14 at 25; Dickson, n 20 
above, at 121. 
28 Zweigert and Kötz, n 26 above, p. 541. 
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meadow.29 One can surmise therefore that Leistungskondiktionen is analogous to the English 
concept of unjust enrichment by subtraction whilst Eingriffskondiktionen appears to approximate 
the English concept of restitution for wrongs.30 However, in contrast with debates by English 
scholars as to whether restitution for wrongs is founded on the principle of unjust enrichment, it is 
accepted that this is so for the concept of Eingriffskondiktion.  
It is usually said that civil law systems do not admit proprietary restitution.31 Yet in a 
comparative survey of restitution and unjust enrichment, it was noted that ‘the interrelationship 
between purely personal unjust enrichment claims and proprietary actions is … subject to many 
debates even within most of the legal systems under review ….’32 The matter therefore may not 
be as clear-cut as believed. For example, if a vendor sells a painting pursuant to a void contract, 
title passes even if the underlying contract is defective under the German concept of 
Abstraktionprinzip. The vendor however can invoke § 812(1) BGB, which is the general clause 
pertaining to rights arising from ‘unjustified enrichment’ and demand restitution of the benefit 
conferred, that is, ownership of the painting.33 Under French domestic law, a claimant may also 
pursue an action based on unjust enrichment to retain or regain title to property which is in the 
defendant’s hands. However, the fundamental difference with the common law is that these are 
personal claims34 whereas the common law conception of proprietary restitution generally 
involves the claimant asserting a proprietary interest.35 On French law, it is said that : ‘the 
revesting of title to the property in the transferor merely forms the background to a personal claim 
                                                 
29 Ibid., p. 544. 
30 Dickson, n 20 above, at 120. 
31 Panagopoulos, n 2 above, pp. 14, 61; G Gretton, ‘Proprietary issues’ in D Johnston and R Zimmermann, 
Unjustified Enrichment : Key Issues in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 
571.  
32 P Schlechtriem, C Coen and R Hornung, ‘Restitution and Unjust Enrichment in Europe’ [2001] 
European Rev of Pri Law 377. 
33 Zweigert and Kötz, n 26 above, p. 542. 
34 A ius in personam ad rem acquirendam : Gretton, n 31 above, p. 579. 
35 Although there is debate as to whether that interest must be a pre-existing interest or one which arose to 
prevent unjust enrichment. See, e.g., W Swadling, ‘A Claim in Restitution?’ [1996] LMCLQ 63; A 
Burrows, ‘Proprietary Restitution : Unmasking Unjust Enrichment’ (2001) 117 LQR 412;  RB Grantham 
and CEF Rickett, ‘Restitution, Property and Ignorance – A Reply to Mr Swadling’ [1996] LMCLQ 463; 
Birks, ‘Misnomer’, n 18 above; Virgo, n 16 above, Chapter 20. 
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based on the other party’s unjust enrichment …. The idea of a claim in rem based on the principle 
of unjust enrichment would strike a French lawyer as a contradiction in terms.’36 Yet, bar 
situations involving insolvency, the end result in common law and civil law systems would be the 
same in most cases. Moreover, rei vindicatio claims37 found in civil law systems import 
‘restitutionary’ principles despite being dealt with within the law of property.38 The important 
point though is that vindicatio claims are not dependent on there being some unjustified 
enrichment.   
From the above cursory study of various domestic laws of restitution, it appears that a 
choice of law rule that purports to be for ‘restitution’ should not just seek to cover claims based 
on the principle of reversing unjust enrichment. It cannot be assumed that all ‘restitutionary’ 
claims will be based on the principle of unjust enrichment. In fact, given this uncertainty, it may 
well be that the more appropriate route is to have a choice of law rule for ‘unjust enrichment’ and 
not a choice of law rule for ‘restitution’. This issue will now be examined.  
 
(B) Reasons against a choice of law rule for ‘restitution’ 
 
The fact that the label ‘restitution’ rather than ‘unjust enrichment’ came to be the more popular 
label for this area of law in the common law world could be said to be a result of historical 
happenstance. It was under the label of ‘restitution’ that ‘the first serious attempts were made to 
overcome the problems of misdescription and misclassification which deprived unjust enrichment 
of its own place on the map of that law.’39 This attempt started in the US in the 1930s and 
culminated in the Restatement of Restitution. However, there is now a concerted effort to redirect 
                                                 
36 J Bell, S Boyron and S Whittaker, Principles of French Law (Oxford : OUP) (1998), pp. 402-403.  
37 Such as § 985 of the BGB which allows an owner who has lost possession of his property to demand the 
property back from the possessor.  
38 T Krebs, Restitution at the Crossroads : A Comparative Study (Cavendish, 2001), p. 229; Schlechtriem et 
al, n 32 above, at 388; BS Markesinis, W Lorenz, G Dannemann, The German Law of Obligations, Volume 
I (Oxford : Clarendon Press) (1997), p. 742.  
39 Birks, n 16 above, p. 4. 
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attention to the core of the subject, that is, the principle of unjust enrichment. The project to 
replace the original Restatement of Restitution restores the full title, Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment, that was first proposed but eventually dropped from the official text published in 
1937. The aim of this reinstatement is to emphasize ‘that the subject matter encompasses an 
independent and coherent body of law, the law of unjust enrichment, and not simply the remedy 
of restitution.’40 
This brings us to the next point. Claims that are potentially discussed under the rubric of 
‘restitution’, that is, claims to reverse unjust enrichment, claims for restitution for wrongs and 
claims for proprietary restitution, all have the common feature of depriving the defendant of a 
gain rather than compensating the claimant for loss suffered. In other words, ‘restitution’ is a term 
of art and the law of restitution can more accurately be defined as the area of law concerned with 
the ‘award of a generic group of remedies.’41 When this definition is transposed onto the conflicts 
of law landscape, one problem is clear : choice of law rules are predicated upon causes of action, 
not remedies. If the law of restitution concerns remedies, then it is fallacious to speak of a choice 
of law rule for restitution. Remedies, according to conflicts orthodoxy, are categorised as being 
procedural in nature. Matters of procedure do not raise choice of law issues; they are always 
governed by the lex fori.42 In contrast, ‘unjust enrichment’ is not usually conflated with remedies. 
In addition, ‘restitution’ as a term of art does not appear to be confined to the common 
law.43 Under French law, a party to a loan, hire or deposit contracts owes the other party an 
obligation de restitution but these obligations are contractual in nature.44  
                                                 
40 ALI website : http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.ppage&node_id=46 (as on 4 August 
2008). 
41 Virgo, n 16 above, p. 3. See also J Walker, Castel & Walker : Canadian Conflict of Laws (Ontario : 
LexisNexis Butterworths) (6th edn, 2005), p. 32-1. 
42 Phrantzes v. Argenti [1960] 2 QB 19.  
43 That ‘restitution’ is more of a ‘term of art’ is also recognised by the draft Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, § 1, comment c : ‘most of what is covered by the law of restitution 
might more helpfully be called the law of unjust or unjustified enrichment.’ 
44 Bell et al, n 36 above, p. 403. English courts have also used the word ‘restitution’ when referring to 
compensatory remedies : Target Holdings Ltd v. Redferns (a firm) [1996] AC 421 (HL); Swindle v. 
Harrison [1997] 4 All ER 705 (CA). See Virgo, n 16 above, p. 429. 
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Another problem with the ‘restitution’ label for choice of law purposes stems from the 
uncertainty of the scope of the subject. There is a growing body of opinion45 that argues that 
claims for restitution for wrongs should be characterised in accordance with the ‘wrong’ and 
governed by the law that governs the wrong.46 The cause of action is the ‘wrong’ itself albeit with 
a restitutionary remedy. In a similar vein, claims for proprietary restitution should be 
characterised as being concerned with ‘property’ and governed by the property choice of law 
rules.47 This approach accords with the multi-causalist argument that restitution for wrongs and 
proprietary restitution are not based on unjust enrichment.  
 
(C) Problems with and reasons for a choice of law rule for ‘unjust enrichment’ 
  
The above makes the case that having the category of ‘restitution’ for choice of law purposes is 
inappropriate. However, there are also detractors for the alternative; some argue that ‘unjust 
enrichment’ as a characterisation category is not ideal either.  
One of the arguments put forward is that ‘unjust enrichment’ is merely a principle and 
not a cause of action in its own right.48 There are two ways to counteract this. First, 
characterisation at the conflicts level is not an exact science. The ‘thing’ that is characterised is 
variously said to be the cause of action,49 issue at stake,50 rule of law,51 or even a combination or 
                                                 
45 Influenced by multi-causalist arguments in domestic law. 
46 Panagopoulos, n 2 above, pp. 81-94; J Bird, ‘Choice of Law’ in Rose (ed), n 2 above, pp. 71-76; R 
Stevens, ‘The Choice of Law Rules of Restitutionary Obligations’ in Rose (ed), n 2, pp. 187-191; TM Yeo, 
Choice of Law for Equitable Doctrines (Oxford : OUP) (2004), pp. 319-320. 
47 R Stevens, ‘Resulting Trusts in the Conflict of Laws’ in P Birks and F Rose (eds), Restitution and Equity, 
Vol. 1, Resulting Trusts and Equitable Compensation (London : Mansfield Press) (2000), p. 154; A Chong, 
‘The Common Law Choice of Law Rules for Resulting and Constructive Trusts’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 855 at 
873-880. 
48 S Pitel, ‘Characterisation of Unjust Enrichment in the Conflict of Laws’ in J Neyers, M McInnes and S 
Pitel (eds), Understanding Unjust Enrichment (Oxford and Portland, Oregon : Hart) (2004), p. 338. 
49 Most self-evidently since choice of law rules are divided up into different actions, such as contact, tort 
and property.  
50 Macmillan Inc. v. Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc (No. 3) [1996] 1 WLR 387.  
51 C Forsyth, ‘Characterisation Revisited : An Essay in the Theory of the English Conflict of Laws’ (1998) 
114 LQR 141. 
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variation of these at the same time.52 If unjust enrichment is merely a principle, no doubt this will 
not be fatal to its forming a ‘thing’ that can be characterised for conflicts purposes. The flexibility 
inherent in the characterisation process should be able to accommodate putting cases which 
concern the unjust enrichment principle in a ‘box’ together.53 Secondly, and compellingly, it is 
incorrect to state that unjust enrichment is merely a principle. A cause of action can be defined as 
a fact or combination of facts which gives rise to a right of action.54 In order to succeed in an 
action for unjust enrichment, the claimant is not relying on any abstract proposition of doing 
justice as might be inferred from use of the word ‘unjust’.55 For example, under English law, the 
claimant has to prove three component elements namely : (i) that the defendant has been 
enriched; (ii) that the enrichment was at the claimant’s expense; (iii) that the enrichment was 
unjust.56 All these elements are then defined in considerable detail and a claimant who proves 
these three elements is plainly relying on facts to establish his right to a remedy.57 In fact, there 
have been judicial dicta referring to unjust enrichment as a cause of action.58 
A different argument that suggests that ‘unjust enrichment’ should not form a separate 
category for characterisation purposes is made by Atiyah and Hedley.59 They argue that cases 
interpreted as being concerned with unjust enrichment  can actually be accommodated within the 
                                                 
52 In Macmillan Inc. v. Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc (No. 3) [1996] 1 WLR 387, Staugton LJ sought to 
characterise the ‘issue’ and ‘question in this action’ (at 391H and 393G); Auld LJ spoke of charactering 
‘the true issue or issues’ and ‘relevant rule of law’ (at 407B-C). 
53 This same flexibility would not at the same time be able to accommodate the problem of ‘restitution’ 
being considered as remedial because of the well-established rule that remedies are procedural in nature 
and therefore governed by the lex fori. 
54 Read v. Brown (1889) 22 QBD 702 (CA) at 131; Coburn v. Colledge [1897] 1 WB 702 (CA); Central 
Electricity Board v. Halifax Corporation [1963] AC 785 (HL) at 800 (Lord Reid). 
55 Although there might have an element of the truth in this in the early days of the law of restitution. In 
Moses v. Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr 1005, 1012; 97 ER 676, 681, Lord Mansfield said : ‘… the gist of this 
kind of action is, that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural 
justice and equity to refund the money.’ See also R Goff and G Jones, The Law of Restitution (London : 
Sweet & Maxwell) (1st edn, 1966), pp. 11-12.  
56 Under Canadian law, the third element is the absence of any juristic reason for the enrichment : Pettkus v. 
Becker [1980] 2 SCR 834, (1980) 117 DLR (3d) 257 (SCC).  
57 See in general, Pitel, n 48 above, pp. 341-344. 
58 Foskett v. McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102 at 129 (Lord Millett); Baltic Shipping Co. v. Dillon (1993) 176 
CLR 344 at 375, 379 (Deane and Dawson JJ). 
59 See Pitel, n 48 above, pp. 338-339. 
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well-established categories of contract, tort and property law.60 Whatever the merits of this 
argument, the law has progressed to the point where unjust enrichment is recognised as being an 
independent branch of the law. Lord Steyn in Banque Financière de law Citè v. Parc (Battersea) 
Ltd stated that ‘unjust enrichment ranks next to contract and tort as part of the law of obligations. 
It is an independent source of rights and obligations.’61 Other jurisdictions as well evidently 
adhere to this view.62 For example, a comment found in the draft Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment affirms that the law of unjust enrichment ‘is itself a source of 
obligations, analogous in this respect to tort or contract.’63 Another example is the German Civil 
Code, whose structure clearly reveals that unjustified enrichment forms an independent category 
in the law of obligations alongside contracts and torts.64  
In addition, from a comparative viewpoint, ‘unjust enrichment’ is a term which has ‘wide 
currency throughout Europe.’65 The acceptance of the unjust enrichment principle in the domestic 
law of legal systems, not only within Europe but throughout the world,66 in contrast with just a 
generalised right to restitution with different underlying bases, is a persuasive point in support of 
a category of ‘unjust enrichment’ rather than ‘restitution’ for conflicts purposes. Indeed, when 
one shifts to the choice of law level, the conclusion that unjust enrichment must be the correct 
label is borne out when one looks at the provisions in other countries who have generally adopted 
the terminology of unjust enrichment for choice of law purposes.67 Article 10 of the Rome II 
Regulation thus is suitably headed ‘Unjust enrichment’. 68 
                                                 
60 PS Atiyah, Essays on Contract (Oxford : Clarendon Press) (1990), pp. 48-56; PS Atiyah, The Rise and 
Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford : Clarendon Press) (1979), pp. 767-768; S Hedley, Restitution : Its 
Division and Ordering (London : Sweet & Maxwell) (2001), pp. 224-228, 231-232.  
61 [1999] 1 AC 221 at 227. 
62 Especially continental ones with a Roman law heritage; see Schlechtriem et al, n 32 above, at 378. 
63 § 1, comment h. 
64 Markesinis et al, n 38 above, p. 711. 
65 Schlechtriem et al, n 32 above, at 379. 
66 A notable restitution scholar has said that that he is unaware of any legal system which has no law of 
unjust enrichment : R Stevens, ‘Choice of Law for Equity : Is it Possible?’ in S Degeling and J Edelman 
(eds), Equity in Commercial Law (Sydney : Lawbook Co.) (2005), p. 177. 
67 E.g. § 46 of the Austrian Federal Statute on Private International Law; Art. 38 of the Introductory Law to 
the German Code of Civil Procedure (hereafter EGBGB); § 35 of the Hungarian Decree on Private 
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(D) Conclusion on the terminological question 
 
Article 10’s choice of label is advantageous from the viewpoint of English lawyers as it would 
accord with both the quadrationist and multi-causalist camps. The quadrationists should approve 
as this characterisation emphasises the centrality of the unjust enrichment principle within the law 
of restitution whilst also appease the multi-causalists as they would presumably characterise 
restitution for wrongs in accordance with the particular wrong involved and proprietary restitution 
as property. Having said that, Recital 11 of the Rome II Regulation makes it clear that the 
concepts covered by the Regulation are subject to European autonomous meanings. This though 
may be difficult in view of the divergences in the domestic systems of restitution. For example, if 
the claim relates to the defendant using a machine belonging to the claimant, the German court 
would likely characterise the claim as lying in the unjust enrichment category69 and hence within 
the scope of Article 10 whereas the English court, if it accepts the arguments of the multi-
causalists, would characterise it in accordance with the ‘wrong’, that is, as a tortious claim and 
outside the scope of Article 10.70 Given that the state of English law of restitution is currently still 
precarious, it is all the more important that English courts take to heart Recital 11 and undertake 
the characterisation process for restitutionary claims in a generous spirit pending guidance from 
the European Court of Justice. One is reminded of Briggs’s counsel that : ‘It is a commonplace 
that conceptual divisions in domestic law do not necessarily translate into the conflict of laws ... 
                                                                                                                                                 
International Law; Art. 128 of the Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law; Art. 3125 of the 
Quebec Civil Code; Art. 14 of the Japanese Horei 2007. Austria, Germany and Hungary will now be 
subject to the Rome II Regulation. 
68 However, claims falling under such an ‘unjust enrichment’ choice of law rule can still be termed as 
‘restitutionary’ claims or claims concerning a ‘restitutionary’ obligation. The latter phrases will therefore 
be used below. 
69 B Dickson, ‘The Law of Restitution in the Federal Republic of Germany : A Comparison with English 
Law’ (1987) 36 ICLQ 751 at 776-777.   
70 See the Torts (Interference With Goods) Act 1977. 
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To take a distinction which is struggling to define itself within the domestic law of restitution and 
then project this into the realm of choice of law may be unwise.’71  
Although it may be concluded that Article 10 is labelled appropriately, this is by no 
means the end of the matter as far as unjust enrichment and conflicts of law is concerned. The 
next question is what should form its content. Coming up with choice of law rules for unjust 
enrichment is problematic as the formulation would have to satisfy the various views on what 
claims belong within the ‘unjust enrichment’ box. How well Article 10 of the Rome II Regulation 
achieves this will now be examined. 
  
III. CHOICE OF LAW RULES FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT : THE ROME II REGULATION 
 
As mentioned above, the Rome II Regulation sets out definitive unjust enrichment choice of law 
rules for the first time in English law. However, there was early resistance on the inclusion of 
unjust enrichment within the scope of the Rome II Regulation. The UK Government and the 
House of Lords’ Select Committee on European Union expressed qualms about the viability of 
including unjust enrichment within the scope of the Rome II Regulation.72 The latter thought that 
it was inadvisable to have a harmonised choice of law rule for unjust enrichment as this was an 
area of law which was in an ‘embryonic state’.73 The main concern was that since the law of 
restitution is still developing and there is no great uniformity between the substantive laws of 
Member States, it would be unwise and premature to attempt to harmonise the choice of law rules 
                                                 
71 A Briggs, ‘Restitution Meets the Conflict of Laws’ [1995] RLR 94 at 97; cited by Auld LJ in Macmillan 
Inc. v. Bishopsgate Investment Trust Plc. and Others (No. 3) [1996] 1 WLR 387 at 407. The quotation was 
in relation with whether a proprietary claim should be classified as restitutionary in nature. 
72 Lord Chancellor’s Department, Consultation Response : Preliminary draft proposal for a Council 
Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Response of the Government of the 
United Kingdom), paras. 20-21; European Union Committee, The Rome II Regulation – Report with 
Evidence (8th Report of Session 2003-04) (HL Paper 66) (London : The Stationery Office Ltd) (2004). The 
Eighth Report is accessible online at : 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldselect/ldeucom/66/6602.htm (as on 4 August 2008). 
73 Ibid., paras. 144, 199. 
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in this area at this point in time.74 Indeed, the state of flux of this area of the law was 
acknowledged by the Commission in the Explanatory Memorandum attached to an earlier version 
of the proposal.75 It was observed that :  
 
‘The difficulty is in laying down rules that are neither so precise that they cannot be 
applied in a Member State whose substantive law makes no distinction between the 
relevant hypotheses nor so general that they might be open to challenge as serving no 
obvious purpose.’76 
 
 Yet, despite the real concerns mentioned above, an overview of individual Member 
States’ unjust enrichment choice of law rules reveals a remarkable similarity across board. The 
same choice of law rules can be observed to crop up in different jurisdictions’ formulations.77 
This suggests that although it may be a developing area of law78 and there may be differences in 
the substantive detail of the various domestic laws of restitution/unjust enrichment, these factors 
may not be crucial at the choice of law level.  
 Article 10 has adopted the more popular forms of choice of law rules. It sets out choice of 
law rules in favour of the law governing the relationship between the parties,79 the law of 
common habitual residence80 and the law of the place of enrichment.81 There is then a 
displacement rule in favour of the law of closest connection.82 However, Article 14, which gives 
parties some autonomy to choose the applicable law, trumps the provisions set out in Article 10. 
                                                 
74 See Lord Chancellor’s Department, n 72 above; R Fentiman, Written Evidence, paras. 4.2, 9.24-9.29; EB 
Crawford, Written Evidence; CGJ Morse, Written Evidence, para. 2 (all Written Evidence cited here and 
below are attached to the Eighth Report, n 72 above).   
75 COM (2003) 427 final. 
76 Ibid., p. 21. 
77 Albeit the hierarchy of the rules may differ. 
78 This is more true of the common law than civil law. 
79 Article 10(1). 
80 Article 10(2). 
81 Article 10(3). 
82 Article 10(4). 
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 Each of these choice of law rules will now be examined in hierarchical order. In addition 
to their appropriateness, the background and possible influences of each rule will be considered. 
 
(A) The recognition of party autonomy : Article 14 
 
The concept of party autonomy has long been recognised in the field of contract.83 This is due to 
the principle of freedom of contract and the desirability of increasing certainty and efficiency in 
international contracts. Party autonomy, however, has had a slower rise in relation to non-
contractual obligations even though the advantages of recognising this concept, such as certainty, 
predictability and avoiding litigation just on the issue of what law governs a claim, apply for both 
contractual and non-contractual obligations. 
Insofar as unjust enrichment is concerned, a number of commentators have in the past 
proposed that since the restitutionary obligation is imposed by law and is not of the parties’ 
volition, party choice should not be relevant.84 However, the fact that the restitutionary obligation 
is imposed by law is not a reason to say that the parties should not have the autonomy to choose 
the law governing the unjust enrichment claim. As has been pointed out by Brereton, frustration 
of a contract is not a matter of volition but is imposed by law; yet few would suggest that 
frustration is not a matter to be governed by the expressly chosen law of the contract.85 This gives 
the lie to the notion that obligations imposed by law cannot be governed by a law chosen by the 
parties.  
                                                 
83 Article 3(1) of the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations [1980] OJ 
L266/1 (hereafter the Rome Convention; enacted into English law by the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 
1990). On party autonomy in contract, see in general P Nygh, Autonomy in International Contracts (Oxford 
: Clarendon Press) (1999). 
84 Gutteridge and Lipstein, n 1 above, at 90; Blaikie, n 2 above, at 123; J Morris, ‘The Choice of Law 
Clause in Statutes’ (1946) 62 LQR 170 at 183; Cohen, n 1 above, at 74; PM North and JJ Fawcett, Cheshire 
and North’s Private International Law (London : Butterworths) (13th edn, 1999) (hereafter Cheshire and 
North), p. 685; P North, Essays in Private International Law (Oxford : Clarendon Press) (1993), p. 43; L 
Collins (gen. ed.), Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws (London : Sweet & Maxwell) (12th edn, 1993), 
p. 1473 (However, the editors’ stance since has considerably softened: see n 7 above, para. 34-016, pp. 
1871-1872). 
85 P Brereton, ‘Restitution and Contract’ in Rose (ed), n 2 above, p. 157.   
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 A limited form of party autonomy is recognised in the Swiss Federal Statute on Private 
International Law. Article 128(2) allows the parties to choose the lex fori if the unjust enrichment 
does not relate to a relationship between the parties. In relation to tort and delict, a more generous 
approach was taken by the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission who 
recommended that the parties’ choice should not be restricted to the lex fori and that the choice 
can be made before or after the occurrence of the tort or delict.86  
 This most liberal understanding of party autonomy is not readily accepted for non-
contractual obligations. While there is growing awareness that restricting party choice to the lex 
fori may be overly parochial, most instruments, like Article 42 of the EGBGB, restrict autonomy 
to a choice made after the unjust enrichment occurs. The decision to allow a post ante but not ex 
ante choice seems to be based on the concern to protect weaker parties.87 However, allowing a 
choice only after the dispute arises is also no guarantee that the weaker party is not taken 
advantage of.88 For example, unless one can be sure that a less economically advantaged party has 
access to the same quality of legal advice which would be available to a wealthier party, there is 
no reason to suppose that a stronger party who has imposed his will on the weaker party prior to 
the dispute will not seek to do so after the dispute arises. In fact, the stronger party will be all the 
more anxious to do so. The weaker party may be better off relying on the standard public policy 
and mandatory rule provisions commonly found in choice of law instruments for protection.  
                                                 
86 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Working Paper No. 87 and Consultative 
Memorandum No. 62 (London : HMSO) (1984), p. 265. However, this recommendation was not followed 
up in either the consequent Report (Law Commission No. 193, Scottish Law Commission No. 129 (London : 
HMSO) (1990)), nor the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 : J Carruthers and 
E Crawford, ‘Variations on a Theme of Rome II. Reflections on Proposed Choice of Law Rules for Non-
Contractual Obligations : Part I’ (2005) 9 Edin LR 65 at 83.  
87 Explanatory Memorandum, COM (2003) 427, p. 22; P Hay, ‘From Rule-Orientation to “Approach” in 
German Conflicts Law : the Effect of the 1986 and 1999 Codifications’ (1999) 47 Am J Comp Law 633 at 
645; Carruthers and Crawford, n 86 above, at 87-88.  
88 Carruthers and Crawford, ibid., at 88.  
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 The Rome II Regulation chooses a halfway house approach. Article 14(1)(a) allows the 
parties to choose the applicable law after the event giving rise to the ‘damage’89 occurs. Article 
14(1)(b) then provides that ‘where all the parties are pursuing a commercial activity’, a choice 
that is ‘freely negotiated before the event giving rise to the damage occurred’90 will be given 
effect. There are two points to note about Article 14.91 First, the restriction to ‘commercial 
activity’ and emphasis on a ‘freely negotiated’ choice are aimed at safeguarding weaker parties’ 
interests.92 The provision probably achieves its objective as it would most clearly cover 
contracting parties who have later cause to sue in unjust enrichment.93 If the contract falls within 
the scope of the Rome Convention, any choice made by the parties would have to pass the 
protectionist rules94 set out in that Convention anyway thus rendering a choice made to govern 
their contract ‘safe’ for use for any consequential unjust enrichment claim. The stress in Article 
14 on free negotiation would help protect parties who do not have the benefit of the Rome 
Convention’s safeguards.  
Secondly, Article 14(1)(b) goes some way towards rectifying an anomaly inherent in the 
Commission’s first draft which only allowed a choice made after, but not before, a dispute arises. 
However, under that first draft, an ex ante choice made to govern, say a contract between the 
parties, would be given effect under Article 10(1)95 as the law governing the relationship between 
the parties to govern any consequential unjust enrichment claim if the contract later fails. In 
practical terms this means that a choice of law made before the dispute but which is not expressly 
stated to cover non-contractual obligations would be given effect in relation to an unjust 
                                                 
89 Article 14 is a general provision covering torts/delicts and unjust enrichment claims. The word ‘damage’ 
is inappropriate for restitutionary claims as liability is not assessed in terms of ‘damage’, but in terms of the 
defendant’s enrichment. A more neutral term such as ‘non-contractual obligation’, which would cover both 
torts/delicts and unjust enrichment claims, should have been substituted. 
90 Note again the inappropriate use of the word ‘damage’. 
91 Note that Article 14(1) does not apply to unfair competition and acts restricting free competition (Article 
6(4)) and infringement of intellectual property rights (Article 8(3)). 
92 Explanatory Memorandum, COM (2006) 83 final, p. 4. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Such as the rules on public policy (Article 16), mandatory rules (Article 7) and specific rules on 
consumers (Article 5) and employees (Article 6). 
95 Previously Article 9(1), COM (2003) 427 final. 
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enrichment claim, whereas an express indication in the contract that a law is chosen specifically 
to govern disputes arising from their transaction would not. The parties in the latter situation were 
being penalised for having the foresight to choose a law to govern disputes before any dispute 
arises. Thus the acceptance by the Commission that a choice may be made before a dispute 
arises is in the interest of autonomy of the parties and would avoid unnecessary litigation.96 
 
(B) Law governing the relationship : Article 10(1) 
 
In the absence of party autonomy, it is commonly accepted that the law governing the relationship 
should govern the action founded on unjust enrichment if the unjust enrichment claim arises out 
of a relationship between the parties.97 The rationale for this is well-put by Zweigert and Müller-
Gindullis :  
  
‘… the law which governs the move from the loser to the winner and which declares the 
shift of assets subject to its control to be unjustified is alone suitable to regulate, in 
addition, the necessity for and the manner of any adjustments to be made between the 
loser and the winner, and to pronounce on the object of the claim for unjustifiable 
enrichment.’98 
 
                                                 
96 See A Briggs, Written Evidence, para. 9; R Fentiman, Written Evidence, para. 9.30; D Wallis, Report on 
the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable to non-
contractual obligations (“Rome II”), A6-0211/2005 (27.6.2005), p. 17.   
97 Art. 10(1) of the Rome II Regulation; § 46 of the Austrian Federal Statute on Private International Law; 
Art. 38(1) of the German EGBGB; Art. 128(1) of the Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law. § 
221(2)(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws lists ‘the place where a relationship between the 
parties was centred, provided that the receipt of the enrichment was substantially related to the relationship’ 
as a contact which is, ‘as to most issues, is given the greatest weight in determining the state of the 
applicable law’ (comment d, p. 730). 
98 N 1 above, para. 20, p. 11. 
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The law governing the relationship should only govern the unjust enrichment claim when 
the relationship is the sine qua non of the restitutionary claim.99 For example, if A has rendered 
services to B pursuant to a contract but B refuses payment, A could rescind the contract and 
pursue a quantum meruit claim100 against B.101 The contract forms the basis upon which B is 
enriched and it is appropriate that the governing law of the contract governs the unjust enrichment 
claim. It is the law of closest connection to the claim.  
The importance of there being a strong link between the relationship and the enrichment 
before this choice of law rule comes into play is recognised explicitly by some statutes. Article 
128(1) of the Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law states that ‘Claims for unjust 
enrichment are governed by the law that governs the actual or assumed legal relationship by 
virtue of which the enrichment occurred.’102 Article 38(1) of the German EGBGB also makes 
clear the importance of the connection between the relationship and the claim : ‘Claims for unjust 
enrichment based on performance rendered are governed by the law applicable to the legal 
relationship with respect to which the performance was rendered.’103 In contrast, the language 
used by Article 10(1) of the Rome II Regulation is more vague as it does not insist on a direct 
correlation between the relationship and the enrichment : ‘If a non-contractual obligation arising 
out of unjust enrichment, …, concerns a relationship existing between the parties, …, that is 
closely connected with that unjust enrichment, it shall be governed by the law that governs that 
relationship.’104 ‘Concerns’ and ‘closely connected’ have been criticised as not making 
sufficiently clear the degree of closeness that is required between the relationship and the 
restitutionary obligation.105 However, despite the potential ambiguity of the phrasing used,106 
                                                 
99 A Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (Oxford : OUP) (2002), p. 197. 
100 Or alternatively sue for breach of contract. 
101 De Bernardy v. Harding (1853) 8 Exch 822. 
102 Translation found in S Symeonides, ‘The New Swiss Conflicts Codification : An Introduction’ (1989) 
37 Am. J. Comp. Law 187 (the “LSU Translation”) (emphasis added).  
103 Translation found in Hay, n 87 above, at 650. 
104 Emphasis added. 
105 T Petch, ‘The Rome II Regulation : An Update : Part 2’ (2006) 21 JIBLR 509 at 513.  
  20 
Article 10(1) should also work to weed out claims which do not arise out of the relationship. For 
example, if A transfers assets to B pursuant to a void contract and B thereupon transfers the same 
asset to C, an argument could be made that the ‘contract’ between A and B is ‘closely connected’ 
to A’s claim against C since but for that ‘contract’, C would not have been enriched. However, 
the wording of Article 10(1) refers to ‘the relationship between the parties’ so the relevant 
connecting factor here is the relationship between A and C, not between A and B. The putative 
governing law of the contract between A and B will not be relevant at all. To give another 
example,107 where trust money is mistakenly paid to a third party recipient, the existence of the 
trust, although incidental to the main unjust enrichment claim which may be brought against the 
third party, may be thought to supply the ‘close connection’ required by Article 10(1). But since 
one is concerned with the relationship between the parties to the action, and not the relationship 
between the parties to the trust, the law governing the latter relationship would not come into play 
under Article 10(1). These conclusions must be correct as the unjust enrichment claims do not 
have their roots in the ‘contract’ between A and B in the first example, or the trust in the second 
example. 
One should therefore only rely on this choice of law rule when the relationship forms an 
essential component of the unjust enrichment claim and not where it merely forms the backdrop 
to the claim. This will have the advantage of ensuring that this choice of law rule only applies 
when the law governing the relationship is the law of closest connection to the claim. 
 There are other advantages in adopting this choice of law rule. Since the law governing 
the relationship would also govern matters prior to the restitutionary claim, consistency of result 
will be achieved by having the same law govern the restitutionary claim itself. This is because 
                                                                                                                                                 
106 Recent cases on what falls within the scope of arbitration and jurisdiction cases have called a liberal and 
common-sensical interpretation of phrases used : Fiona Trust & Holding v. Privalov [2007] 4 All ER 951; 
Leo Laboratories v. Crompton BV [2005] 2 IR 225. 
107 Panagopoulos, n 2 above, p. 150. 
  21 
both stem from a single state of affairs.108 In addition, it would be rational to conclude that if the 
parties had given any thought to the matter, they would have expected that the law governing 
their relationship would govern any matters arising from that relationship. Thus, the parties’ 
legitimate expectations are preserved. 
 Another point that could be raised is that, to a certain extent, this choice of law rule is 
able to deal with the problem of uncertainty over the scope of the law of restitution and the unjust 
enrichment principle that was discussed above. This is done primarily by minimising 
characterisation problems. To revert back to domestic English terminology, both quadrationists 
and multi-causalists accept that claims arising out of a failed contract would be classed as unjust 
enrichment claims. Dealing with these claims at the choice of law level is straightforward – they 
would be governed by the governing law of the contract in accordance with this choice of law 
rule. However, what about the more contentious categories of restitution for wrongs109 and 
proprietary restitution110? For example, a claim for an account of profits made due to a breach of 
fiduciary duty would be considered by some to be based on the reversal of unjust enrichment111 
and therefore fall within the scope of a choice of law rule for unjust enrichment. Where there is a 
pre-existing relationship between the parties, this choice of law rule would apply and point 
towards the law governing the relationship between the fiduciary and principal.112 Others 
however, would class this type of claim as an example of restitution for wrongs and one which is 
not based on the principle of unjust enrichment.113 Insofar as the claim relates to breach of duties 
arising from voluntary undertakings within consensual relationships, Yeo suggests that the law 
                                                 
108 Although this justification, in itself, does not make a case for having the law governing the relationship 
govern the restitutionary consequences of that relationship. See A Chong, ‘Choice of Law for Void 
Contracts and their Restitutionary Aftermath : The Putative Governing Law of the Contract’ in P Giliker 
(ed), Re-examining Contract and Unjust Enrichment (Leiden/Boston : Martinus Nijhoff) (2007), pp. 178-
181.  
109 See Section IV(A). 
110 See Section IV(B). 
111 Burrows, n 16 above, p. 6.  
112 Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim 15 June 1994 (Chadwick J.); Kuwait Oil Tanker SAK v. Al Bader (No. 
3) [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 271 (CA); BJ McAdams Inc v. Winston M Boggs 439 F Supp 738. See also A-
G for England and Wales v. R [2002] 2 NZLR 91 (CA Wellington) [29]-[30]. 
113 Virgo, n 16 above, pp. 9-11, 500-525. 
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governing the pre-existing relationship should also govern the claim for unauthorised profits. 
However, Yeo’s suggestion is based on the premise that such claims are analogous to contractual 
claims and should thus in the first place be characterised as contractual.114 The contract choice of 
law rule points towards the law governing the relationship between the parties, that is, the 
governing law of the contract.115 Therefore the same result is reached irrespective of whether the 
claim is classed as being an unjust enrichment claim or as a contractual claim.   
 If we now turn towards the field of proprietary restitution, scholars such as Birks116 and 
Burrows117 argue that such claims are again based on the unjust enrichment principle. Virgo, on 
the other hand, thinks claims for proprietary restitution are based on the law of property and the 
principle of vindication of property rights.118 If one transposes these arguments to a choice of law 
level, Virgo’s views would lead to characterising the claim as a property one which is governed 
by the property choice of law rule. So if the claimant is arguing that land in Canada is held on a 
constructive trust for him, Canadian law would apply as the lex situs in accordance with the 
property choice of law rule.119 On Birks’s and Burrows’s alternative viewpoint, the claim should 
presumably be characterised as being an unjust enrichment claim for conflicts purposes. It is 
suggested that Canadian law would also be the law governing the relationship between the parties 
for the particular issue of whether the land is held on trust for the claimant. Even if there is, say, a 
contract between the two parties relating to the land that is governed by some other law, arguably, 
since the land is situated in Canada, Canadian law trumps the governing law of the contract 
because the precise issue at stake relates to title and ownership of the land. Canadian law is the 
law which would govern the rights and obligations of the parties towards each other vis a vis the 
land, that is, Canadian law is the law that governs the relationship between the parties on this 
                                                 
114 N 46 above, pp. 215-235. 
115 Articles 3 and 4 of the Rome Convention. 
116 N 16 above, pp. 32-38, Chapter 8. 
117 Burrows, n 16 above, pp. 60-75 and n 35 above. 
118 N 16 above, pp. 11-17, Chapter 20. 
119 Nelson v. Bridport (1846) 8 Beav 547. 
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particular issue. Thus, under either route, Canadian law arguably should end up governing the 
claim.120  
Therefore, having this choice of law rule in a restitutionary choice of law formulation 
helps to minimise characterisation problems. It would not matter whether the claim is 
characterised as being contractual or restitutionary, proprietary or restitutionary, as the same 
choice of law rule would apply. In view of its myriad advantages, it is unsurprising that this 
choice of law rule is given primacy in Article 10121 as Articles 10(2) and 10(3) only apply if there 
is no pre-existing relationship. 
 
(C) Law of common habitual residence of the parties : Article 10(2) 
 
Article 10(2) of the Rome II Regulation provides that where the claim does not concern a 
relationship between the parties, if ‘the parties have their habitual residence in the same country 
when the event giving rise to unjust enrichment occurs, the law of that country shall apply.’ 
 This choice of law rule is commonly found in tort choice of law. Article 4(2) of the Rome 
II Regulation sets out the same choice of law rule for tortious cases but examples can be found in 
earlier statutes. Article 133(1) of the Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law Statute, 
and Article 40(2) of the German EGBGB122 and § 32(3) of the Hungarian Decree on Private 
International Law set out tort choice of law rules in favour of the law of common habitual 
residence123 or common domicile.124  
                                                 
120 On the problem of the exclusion of renvoi from the Rome II Regulation, see Section IV(C). 
121 It also finds favour in many statutory (see n 97 above) and academic formulations (Dicey, Morris and 
Collins’s Rule 230(2)(a) (law governing the contract), n 7 above, para. 34R-001, p. 1863; Bird, n 46 above, 
section 1(a) and (b), p. 135; Brereton, n 85 above (law governing the contract); Zweigert and Müller-
Gindullis, n 1 above, para. 20, p. 11). 
122 This has its roots in rather parochial 1942 Nazi statute providing for the application of German law to 
torts committed between German citizens whilst abroad. See M Reimann, ‘Codifying Torts Conflicts : The 
1999 German Legislation in Comparative Perspective’ (1999-2000) 60 La L Rev 1297 at 1301, footnote 18. 
123 Switzerland and Germany. 
124 Hungary. 
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Although there have not been as many explicit provisions in favour of the common 
personal law of the parties in the field of unjust enrichment as for tort, some statutes provide for 
the application of the law of common habitual residence in a more indirect manner. § 221(2)(d) of 
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws lists the ‘domicil, residence, nationality, place of 
incorporation and place of business of the parties’ as a contact to be taken into account for choice 
of law for restitutionary actions and the commentary states that ‘the fact that the domicil and 
place of business of all parties are grouped in a single state is an important factor to be considered 
in determining the state of the applicable law.’125 After setting out primary choice of law rules in 
favour of other laws,126 Article 41(1) of the German EGBGB provides a displacement rule in 
favour of the law of closest connection.127 The fact that both parties are habitually resident in the 
same place at the time the causal facts took place is listed as an indication that there might be a 
substantially closer connection to the unjust enrichment claim than the law designated by the 
primary choice of law rules.128 The explicit provision for the law of common habitual residence 
for claims for unjust enrichment in the Rome II Regulation is therefore an unsurprising 
progression of status. 
  It might be speculated that the rationale for this choice of law rule stems from the 
American governmental interest doctrine and the series of tort cases where the parties’ common 
home state overrode the lex loci delicti.129 Babcock v. Jackson130 concerned resident New Yorkers 
who had an accident in Ontario. In an action by the passenger against the driver for injuries 
suffered during that accident, the court held that New York law had a greater interest in being 
applied than Ontario law. What was at issue in Babcock was the extent of the driver’s liability 
                                                 
125 Comment d, p. 733. 
126 Article 38 EGBGB. 
127 A displacement rule in favour of the law of closest connection will be examined separately below; see 
section III(E). 
128 Article 41(2)(2). This covers claims that are not based on performance. 
129 Petch, n 105 above, at 455; ‘Editorial comments : Sometimes it takes thirty years and even more …’ 
(2007) 44 CMLR 1567 at 1571.  
130 12 NY 2d 473, 191 NE 2d 279, 240 NYS 2d 743(1963). The case is said to be the starting point of the 
American choice of law revolution : Cheshire and North, n 84 above, p. 606. 
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towards her passenger. Ontario had a ‘guest’ statute under which a driver was not liable for 
injuries caused to gratuitous passengers whilst New York had no such law. Since the parties were 
both from New York, the purposes of the Ontario ‘guest’ statute, amongst which were to protect 
Ontario drivers and insurance companies, were not germane. Whereas New York law, New York 
being the place where the guest-host relationship arose and the start point and supposed end point 
of the trip, had a greater claim to be applied. So New York law was not applicable merely 
because it was the home state of both parties, it was applicable because it was thought to provide 
the ‘center of gravity’ for the particular issue at stake.131 There is no mechanism for this type of 
sophisticated analysis under Article 10(2) of the Rome II Regulation as it merely sets out a rigid 
rule in favour of the law of common habitual residence outside relationship-based claims.132  
 The rationale for this choice of law rule therefore cannot be that the law of the common 
habitual residence has the closer connection to the claim133 merely because both parties reside in 
that jurisdiction. Its rationale must lie in more simple and uncomplicated reasons. For one, the 
fact that the parties are habitually resident in the same place means that trial will likely take place 
there too. The convenience of the court applying its own law need hardly be stated. For another, 
since the parties come from the same environment, they would likely have the same or similar 
expectations134 and it therefore makes sense that their common law would govern any claims 
arising between them.  
 Nevertheless, there are objections against a choice of law rule prefaced on the personal 
law of the parties. The main complaint is that it leads to fortuitous results.135 This form of choice 
                                                 
131 It was conceded by Fuld J that the lex loci delicti might be more appropriate if the issue at stake had 
been whether the driver exercised due care whilst driving : 12 NY 2d 473 at 483.  
132 A ‘centre of gravity’ based analysis would be possible under the German EGBGB since the common 
habitual residence of the parties is only relevant under the displacement rule of closest connection.  
133 Although the rule of course has the closer connection to the parties. 
134 Reimann, n 122 above, at 1301. 
135 Bird, n 46 above, p. 108; Zweigert and Müller-Gindullis, n 1 above, para. 25, pp. 13-14. 
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of law rule used to be directed towards the common nationality of the parties136 before being 
expanded to encompass common residence.137 The criticism of fortuity has credence if common 
nationality were to be the connecting factor;138 however, the modern focus on the place where the 
parties normally reside and live means that there is the likelihood that this choice of law rule 
would result in a court applying its own law and protecting parties’ shared expectations as 
mentioned above. These practical advantages outweigh the fortuity point.  
 Having said that, the law of common habitual residence must play second fiddle to the 
law governing the relationship if the enrichment arises out of a relationship between the parties. 
The former, for the reasons stated above, is the more appropriate choice of law rule in 
relationship-based cases. The hierarchy adopted in the Rome II Regulation is correct. 
 
(D) A territorially-based choice of law rule : Article 10(3) 
 
There has always been considerable enthusiasm for a territorially-based rule for at least some, if 
not all, unjust enrichment claims. In earlier choice of law proposals, a territorially-based choice of 
law rule for unjust enrichment was based on an analogy with the lex loci delicti rule for torts and 
the vested rights theory.139 This analogy has been shown to be inappropriate.140 Even though both 
unjust enrichment and tort involve non-consensual legal consequences attaching to factual 
events,141 unjust enrichment arises by operation of law and not from acts or omissions as torts 
do.142 In addition, for some multi-causalists at least, unjust enrichment is not wrong-based143 and 
                                                 
136 E.g. Art. 31(2) of the Polish Law on Private International Law of 12 November 1965 and earlier 
versions of the German EGBGB rule. See Hay, n 87 above, at 637. 
137 Hay, ibid. (in relation to the German EGBGB). 
138 Since one can still be a national of a country even after having long left that country. There is also the 
problem of dual-nationality. 
139 See Cohen, n 1 above, at 78; Collier, n 1 above, p. 85.  
140 See Collier, ibid., pp. 83-84; Zweigert and Müller-Gindullis, n 1 above, para. 13, p. 7. Cf. Panagopoulos, 
n 2 above, pp. 160, 164. 
141 Zweigert and Müller-Gindullis, n 1 above, para. 4, p. 5. 
142 Collier, n 1 above, p. 83. 
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therefore is not focused on the defendant’s acts. Furthermore, the vested rights theory has now 
been largely discredited.144 
Nevertheless, the rejection of the vested rights theory and the tortious analogy does not 
mean that a territorially-based rule should be summarily dismissed; other grounds can be found 
on which to substantiate support for such a rule. The problem is that there are three main potential 
loci : the place of the act giving rise to the enrichment, the place of loss, and the place of 
enrichment.  
The law of the place of loss was principally proposed by Cohen145 and has few other 
supporters. There are more authorities in favour of the law of the place of the act and the law of 
the place of enrichment. The relevant draft provision in the Rome II Regulation vacillated 
between these two options. In the Commission’s first draft, the choice of law provision was in 
favour of ‘the law of the country in which the enrichment takes place.’146 However, Wallis, the 
Rapporteur for the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs, argued against 
application of the law of the place of enrichment on the grounds that the place of enrichment 
could be entirely fortuitous; for example, the applicable law would then be dependent upon where 
a fraudster chooses to open the bank account to which monies are fraudulently paid over.147 
Instead, she advocated application of the law of the country in which the event giving rise to the 
unjust enrichment substantially occurred. Although the Commission indicated that it accepted this 
amendment,148 Article 10(3) of the final version of Rome II seems to reinstate the Commission’s 
first draft’s preference and is worded in terms of ‘the law of the country in which the unjust 
                                                                                                                                                 
143 L Smith, ‘The Province of the Law of Restitution’ (1992) 71 Can Bar Rev 672 at 683; Bird, n 46 above, 
pp. 72, 112. 
144 See Cheshire and North, n 84 above, pp. 20-22. 
145 N 1 above. Cohen depends on the (inappropriate) analogy with tort, the fact that the label ‘restitution’ 
emphasises the person who has suffered the loss, and that the place of loss will seldom have only a casual 
connection with the transaction giving rise to the restitutionary obligation.  
146 Article 9(3), COM (2003) 427 final. 
147 Wallis, n 96 above, p. 26. 
148 COM (2006) 83 final, p. 17. 
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enrichment took place.’149 The question to be considered is whether the better option has been 
chosen. 
 
1. The options : the law of the place of the act or the law of the place of enrichment? 
 
While Article 13 of the EEC Preliminary Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
and Non-Contractual Obligations is in favour of ‘the law of the country in which that event 
occurred’,150 there is much more support for the law of the place of enrichment. § 46 of the 
Austrian Federal Statute of Private International Law, Article 38(3) of the German EGBGB, § 35 
of the Hungarian Decree on Private International Law, Article 128(2) of the Swiss Federal Statute 
on Private International Law, Dicey, Morris and Collins’s Rule 230(2)(c), § 453 of the 
Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws, all opt for the law of the place of enrichment.151 In 
addition, although the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws lists both ‘the place where the act 
conferring the benefit or enrichment was done’152 and ‘the place where the benefit or enrichment 
was received’153 as factors to be taken into account when trying to determine the applicable law, 
the commentary reveals that priority is to be given to the latter.154  
This prevailing of the law of the place of enrichment over the law of the place of the act 
can be justified. A choice of law rule in favour of the law of the place of the act causing the unjust 
enrichment suffers from several flaws. First, it has been pointed out that liability in unjust 
enrichment derives from the effect of an act and not the act itself. It is the fact of enrichment 
                                                 
149 [2007] L199/40 (31.7.2007). 
150 This Convention never came to fruition. Attention was thereafter focussed on contractual obligations the 
result of which was the Rome Convention. on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations [1980] OJ 
L266/1. This was enacted into English law by the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990. 
151 So too does Canadian law; see n 41 above, p. 32-1. 
152 § 221(2)(c). 
153 § 221(2)(b). 
154 Comment d, pp. 732-733. 
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which gives rise to a claim for unjust enrichment.155 Thus, even though the act is typically one of 
the most significant elements of the events leading to a claim, it is not as significant an element as 
the defendant’s enrichment. This leads to the second point, which is that since the emphasis of an 
action in unjust enrichment is not on the act but on the defendant’s enrichment, the place of the 
act will not normally be closely connected with the obligation to reverse an unjust enrichment.156 
In addition, this choice of law rule would not strictly cover an obligation which arises as a result 
of an omission. This could possibly be circumvented as most omissions could be attributed a 
locus which could be considered as the counterpart of the locus of an act giving rise to the 
enrichment. For example, an omission to abide by certain formalities would be situated in the 
country where those formalities should have been observed. However, an obligation which is not 
based on an event or non-event is more problematic. Thus, it is not clear how contractual 
incapacity would work under this choice of law rule.157  
 
2. The preferred choice of law rule : the law of the place of enrichment 
 
The above has argued against adopting the law of the place of the act. Nevertheless, a choice of 
law rule in favour of the law of the place of enrichment is also not without its critics. Some of the 
criticisms are on the basis that claims for unjust enrichment commonly arise when the parties are 
or assume they are in a legal relationship, therefore the law governing the legal relationship is 
preferable as the transfer of assets would have taken place based on the relationship.158 This can 
be dealt with easily; the law of the place of enrichment should be the choice of law rule where 
there is no prior relationship between the parties. Where there is such a relationship and the unjust 
                                                 
155 Collier, n 1 above, p. 86; Zweigert and Müller-Gindullis, n 1 above, para. 13, p. 7. 
156 Bird, n 46 above, p. 111. 
157 Bennett, n 2 above, at 148. 
158 Zweigert and Müller-Gindullis, n 1 above, para. 14, p. 7. 
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enrichment claim arises from that relationship, the law governing the relationship should govern. 
This is the approach adopted by Article 10. 
However, not all are satisfied even after confining the law of the place of enrichment to 
‘non-relational restitution.’159 Although Rule 230(2)(c) of Dicey, Morris and Collins has received 
judicial approval,160 the commentary notes that sub-rule 2(c) only represents a starting point for 
the identification of the proper law of the restitutionary obligation outside cases falling within 
sub-rules 2(a) and (b). This ‘lukewarm’161 support is also echoed by Collins J. in Barros Mattos 
where he stated that it only a ‘tentative formulation’ and not to be treated as a ‘free-standing rule’ 
to be mechanically applied.162  
The unenthusiastic reception towards a law of the place of enrichment rule is rather 
surprising given that many of its perceived flaws can be ironed out, particularly if the definition 
of ‘place of enrichment’ is further refined. The most commonly cited disadvantages are that it 
may be fortuitous and have little connection with the unjust enrichment claim,163 be difficult to 
identify164 and open to manipulation by the defendant.165 The first point can be countered : since 
the heart of unjust enrichment actions is the defendant’s enrichment, the place of enrichment, 
even if fortuitous, will be one of the most appropriate connecting factors to consider as it goes to 
the core of the action. Moreover, it is said that :  
 
                                                 
159 Briggs, n 99 above, p. 198. 
160 Chase Manhattan Bank NA v. Israel-British Bank [1981] Ch 105; Re Jogia [1988] 1 WLR 484; [1988] 2 
All ER 328; El Ajou v. Dollar Land Holdings [1993] 3 All ER 717, reversed on other grounds [1994] 2 All 
ER 685 (CA); Kuwait Oil Tanker Co SAK v. Al Bader, Moore-Bick J., unreported, November 16, 1998, 
affirmed [2000] All ER (Comm) 271; Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp Ltd v. United Overseas 
Bank [1992] 2 Sing LR 495. 
161 Burrows, n 16 above, p. 617. 
162 Barros Mattos Junior v. MacDaniels Ltd [2005] EWHC 1323 (Ch D), [2005] ILPr 45, at [117]. See also 
[86]-[105].  
163 Bird, n 46 above, p. 114; Blaikie, n 2 above, at 120; Brereton, n 85 above, p. 152; Zweigert and Müller-
Gindullis, n 1 above, para. 14, p. 7; Morris, n 84 above, at 182; Wallis, n 96 above, p. 26. 
164 Bennett, n 2 above, at 149; Bird, n 46 above, p. 114; Zweigert and Müller-Gindullis, n 1 above, para. 14, 
p. 7. 
165 Bird, n 46 above, p. 110; Briggs, n 99 above, p. 198. In Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim [1993] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 543 at 566, the plaintiff suggested that the defendant had deliberately arranged the place of 
enrichment to be outside Abu Dhabi. 
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‘given that the liability is imposed on the defendant involuntarily, it is preferable to found 
it on a law which is connected with him; the law of the place of the defendant’s 
enrichment is … closely connected with the defendant ….’166   
 
 The second criticism, that the place of enrichment is difficult to identify, is particularly 
acute in relation to electronic transfers of funds and e-commerce transactions. When the funds 
have passed through more than one jurisdiction, there could be more than one potential location 
of enrichment. For example, if money was mistakenly transferred to A’s bank account in New 
York, but A withdraws the money in the London branch of the bank, which is the place of 
enrichment? Is it the place of immediate enrichment (New York) or the place of ultimate 
enrichment (London)? One could look at the circumstances of each case to determine whether the 
place of ultimate or immediate enrichment provides the closest connection to the restitutionary 
obligation.167 However, when the facts are quite evenly balanced between both places, the 
decision to be made by the court would be difficult and, some would argue, arbitrary.168 
The problem with advocating the place of ultimate enrichment is that no place can be 
considered as the place of ultimate enrichment until the funds are settled in one jurisdiction, or 
the defendant withdraws the funds in a certain jurisdiction. Hwang J.C. gives this example :  
 
‘If the fraudster is in the process of transferring the misappropriated funds from country A to 
country D using countries B and C as intermediate points, what happens if the funds are 
attached by a court order in country C? This would not be the country of immediate benefit 
(which would be country B) nor the country of ultimate enrichment (which is intended to be 
country D) unless it could be argued that country C has become the place of ultimate 
                                                 
166 Bird, n 46 above, p. 114. 
167 Dicey, Morris and Collins, n 7 above, para. 34-052, p. 1889.   
168 Panagopoulos, n 2 above, pp. 137-138. This is also one of the reasons why Briggs, n 99 above, p. 198, 
rejects a place of enrichment choice of law rule : ‘a rule which is based on this matter of happenstance is 
hard to promote.’ 
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enrichment by virtue of the court order. Further difficulties would arise with this latter 
argument if the court order in country C prevents the fraudster from receiving the funds in 
country C by (say) freezing them in the hands of the bank – where then would the enrichment 
be?’169 
 
It is suggested that the place of immediate enrichment would be a better option for the 
following reasons.170 First, it is more easily identifiable than the place of ultimate enrichment in 
situations such as that described by Hwang J.C., since the identification process does not hinge on 
any further transfers that may be instigated by the defendant. Secondly, an analogy can be drawn 
with other provisions. For tortuous and delictual claims, Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation 
favours the ‘law of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of the country in which 
the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in which 
the indirect consequences of that event occur’. Moreover, there is Article 5(3) of the Brussels I 
Regulation which gives jurisdiction to the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred in 
matters relating to tort. ‘The place where the harmful event occurred’ has been interpreted to 
cover the place where the direct damage occurs and not the place where indirect damage 
occurs.171 Thirdly, it does appear that under English law at least, immediate enrichment would be 
enough to found the legal cause of action.172 Fourthly, while both the places of immediate and 
ultimate enrichment are subject to a risk of the third criticism listed above, namely, manipulation 
                                                 
169 Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v. United Overseas Bank [1992] 2 SLR 495 at 500-501. 
170 Bowling v. Cox [1926] AC 751 (PC). Cf. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v. United Overseas 
Bank [1992] 2 SLR 495, where Singaporean law as the law of the place of ultimate enrichment was applied 
based on the interpretation that Dicey, Morris and Collins’s Rule 230(2)(c) referred to the place of ultimate 
enrichment. However, it must be noted that Hwang J.C. observed, at 501, that on one view, Singapore 
could be regarded as being the only place of enrichment, in which case no choice was made between the 
places of ultimate or immediate enrichment. 
171 Dumez France and Tracoba v. Hessische Landesbank  Case 220/88 [1990] ECR 49; Marinari v. Lloyds 
Bank plc (Zubaidi Trading Co. Intervener) Case C-364/93 [1996] QB 217. 
172 In the case of electronic transfers of money, the recipient is enriched by acquiring a chose in action in 
the nature of a debt owed to him by the bank.  This is obviously the case if title passed in the transaction, as 
will normally be the case with money (as title to money passes on delivery). In these circumstances, the 
recipient is clearly benefited by the bank's crediting of his account.    
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by one of the parties to ensure that receipt takes place in a country whose law is favourable to that 
party, the place of immediate enrichment is less amenable, in most cases, to manipulation. This is 
because the payor has to agree to send the funds to a particular place and the fraudster has to 
agree to receive the funds, at least initially, in that same place. This last point also illustrates that 
the law of the place of immediate enrichment would be less fortuitous since the initial place of 
transfer needs at least to be agreed upon by two parties. In contrast, if one prefers the place of 
ultimate enrichment, the fraudster could transfer funds from one jurisdiction to another at will and 
the place of ultimate enrichment could depend upon where and when the funds are withdrawn or 
a freezing order is obtained.  
This conclusion, that the law of the place of immediate enrichment is preferable to the 
law of the place of ultimate enrichment, is also borne out when one looks at enrichment in e-
commerce transactions. For example, how do you identify the place of enrichment if credit card 
details are provided to the incorrect party over the internet and payment is taken from the card? 
Fawcett, Harris and Bridge suggest that enrichment takes place wherever the payee’s bank 
account is situated. So, if a French credit card company pays money into the payee’s bank 
account in Germany, the payee is enriched in Germany and German law governs the 
consequential unjust enrichment claim even if the payee is resident in and ultimately withdraws 
the money in England.173  
 Therefore, it is suggested that the final version of Article 10(3) of the Rome II Regulation 
goes for the correct choice of law option. The law of the place of enrichment provides a 
satisfactory choice of law rule for non-relational restitutionary claims.174 Moreover, references to 
                                                 
173 J Fawcett, J Harris and M Bridge, International Sale of Goods in the Conflict of Laws (Oxford : OUP) 
(2005), p. 1313. They also argue that where a service provider has supplied digitized products to the wrong 
person, the state where the recipient downloads the product is the place of enrichment : pp. 1313-1314.  
174 So, given that the defendant (secondary recipient) in Barros Mattos Junior v. MacDaniels Ltd [2005] 
EWHC 1323 (Ch D), [2005] ILPr 45, would have been immediately enriched in Switzerland when the 
disputed funds were credited into his bank account there, Swiss law should straightforwardly have been 
identified as the applicable law of the restitutionary claim notwithstanding the defendant’s residence in 
Nigeria or the fact that the transactions between the primary recipient and the defendant took place in 
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the law of the place of enrichment should always be understood as referring to the law of the 
place of immediate enrichment. It is the rule which would do justice in most cases and there are 
enough reasons in its favour to be able to discard the practise of having to consider whether the 
place of immediate or ultimate enrichment provide the closer connection to the claim.175 
However, although it has been held that the law of the place of enrichment should govern 
wrongs-based claims176 and assertions that property is held on a constructive trust,177 it is 
suggested that better approaches exist for these types of claims.178 This will be dealt with 
below.179 
  
(E) Displacement rule in favour of the law of closest connection : Article 10(4) 
 
Most choice of law rules seek to identify a connecting factor which will point towards the law of 
closest connection to the claim.180 So, for example, torts are generally thought to be most closely 
                                                                                                                                                 
Nigeria. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the cause of action would have arisen immediately 
once the defendant’s bank account in Switzerland was credited. That said, the factual ties with Nigeria were 
thought to be important by Collins J. and it may be Nigerian law would be of relevance in establishing the 
defendant’s degree of knowledge. But the extent of the role to be played by Nigerian law would be 
something for Swiss law to decide (in the sense of establishing the threshold of knowledge and not in the 
sense of a renvoi by Swiss law to Nigerian law).   
175 The example given in Dicey, Morris and Collins of a situation where the law of the place of ultimate 
enrichment applies instead of the law of the place of immediate enrichment is where payment in made at 
the Paris branch of an English bank to be credited to the account of X at the London branch of the same 
bank. The proper law here is English law, which is identified as the law of the place of ultimate enrichment 
: para. 34-052, p. 1889. However, surely English law is actually the law of the place of immediate 
enrichment given that X’s enrichment only arises when the money is actually credited to his account in 
England? 
176 El Ajou v. Dollar Land Holdings [1993] 3 All ER 717, reversed on other grounds [1994] 2 All ER 685 
(CA); Kuwait Oil Tanker Co SAK v. Al Bader, Moore-Bick J., unreported, November 16, 1998, affirmed 
[2000] All ER (Comm) 271; Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp Ltd v. United Overseas Bank [1992] 
2 Sing LR 495. 
177 Christopher v. Zimmerman (2001) 192 DLR (4th) 476 (BCCA).  
178 Although, in relation to proprietary restitutionary claims involving title to land, the place of enrichment 
would be synonymous with the lex situs which is the preferred choice of law rule.  
179 Sections IV(A) and (B). 
180 Such as the rules contained in the Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law, Austrian Federal 
Statute of Private International Law (made explicit in §1(2)) and Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 
(which generally tries to identify the state with which the parties and transaction have the ‘most significant 
relationship’). See S McCaffrey, ‘The Swiss Draft Conflicts Law’ (1980) 28 Am J Comp Law 235 at 249-
250. 
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connected to the place where the tort occurred; hence the predominance of the lex loci delicti rule 
for torts. Unjust enrichment claims which arise out of a relationship are seen to be most closely 
connected to that relationship and therefore, as seen above, the law governing the relationship is 
generally accepted to be the choice of law rule for this particular situation.  
Some go further and think that the law of closest connection should be the only choice of 
law rule for unjust enrichment claims.181 This suggestion usually takes the form of a proper law of 
the restitutionary obligation. Lord Penrose in Baring Brothers v. Cunninghame District Council 
held that first, the restitutionary obligation is governed by the proper law of that obligation and, 
secondly, the proper law of the obligation is the law of the country with which, in the light of the 
whole facts and circumstances, the critical events had their closest and most real connection.182 
A fully flexible choice of law rule however raises the problem of too much uncertainty. 
Indeed, most unjust enrichment choice of law frameworks are content with a displacement rule 
which allows courts to disregard the applicable law that is determined according to the general 
rules in favour of the law of closest connection in certain situations. Article 10(4) of the Rome II 
Regulation, like Article 41 of the German EGBGB and Article 15 of the Swiss Federal Statute on 
Private International Law, is to this effect.183 Whilst the provisions in Article 10 points towards 
sensible connecting factors and would, in the main, point towards the law of closest connection 
anyway, a displacement rule in favour of the law of closest connection forms a useful component 
in any unjust enrichment choice of law framework given the various permutations in which 
claims may arise. The problem is ensuring that courts do not invoke the displacement rule so 
freely that it becomes the norm rather than the exception.  
                                                 
181 Or at least, the only choice of law rule outside relational unjust enrichment : Briggs, n 99 above, p. 198. 
182 [1997] CLC 108 at 127; rejecting Dicey and Morris’s formulation and preferring the approach taken by 
Blaikie, n 2 above. See also Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 543, at 565-566, revd. 
on other grounds [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 589, at 597 (CA) and Cheshire and North, n 84 above, pp. 687-692. 
183 These displacement rules generally do not apply when parties have exercised their autonomy to choose 
the applicable law of the non-contractual obligation. 
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Article 10(4) seeks to prevent this from happening. The standard that is required before it 
can be invoked appears to be very high. Article 10(4) states that the law of a country other than 
that pin-pointed by the prior choice of law rules applies only ‘where it is clear from all the 
circumstances that the non-contractual obligation is manifestly more closely connected’ to that 
other country.184 One may wish to compare this form of words with that in Article 4(5) of the 
Rome Convention, which provides that the presumptions set out earlier in Article 4, which point 
towards the law of closest connection of the contract where the parties have made no choice of 
applicable law of the contract, is rebutted if ‘it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the 
contract is more closely connected with another country’. There have been a number of cases 
considering whether Article 4(5) is to be applied restrictively or liberally, with courts in different 
Member States not reaching any consistent interpretation.185 However, similar litigation and 
disparity between the courts should be avoided for Article 10(4) as it is clear from the stronger 
form of words used for Article 10(4) that it should only be invoked in limited circumstances.  
Having said that, the role to be played by Article 10(4) may prove to be more extensive 
than initially envisaged. This displacement rule may potentially be able to, on the one hand, cater 
to the differences of opinion between quadrationists and multi-causalists in domestic English law, 
and, on the other hand, help smooth over the gaps that exist between civil law and common law 
conceptions of unjust enrichment. This will be considered in section IV next, in the context of 
examining how restitution for wrongs and proprietary restitution could be dealt with under the 
Rome II Regulation. 
                                                 
184 Emphasis added. 
185 The English courts favour a more liberal application of Article 4(5) in comparison with the Scottish and 
Dutch courts. See Bank of Baroda v. Vysya Bank [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 87; Definitely Maybe (Touring) Ltd 
v. Marek Lieberberg Konzertagentur GmbH [2001] 4 All ER 283. Cf. Caledonia Subsea Ltd v. Micoperi 
Srl (First Division, Inner House, Court of Session) 2001 SC 716 (OH), 2003 SC 70; Société Nouvelle des 
Papeteries de l’Aa v. Machinefabriek BOA, 25 September, NJ (1992) No. 750, RvdW (1992) No. 207 
(Dutch Supreme Court). The draft Rome I Regulation (COM (2005) 650 final) has dealt with this problem 
by replacing the series of presumptions with fixed rules; the draft Article 4(1) sets out choice of law rules in 
favour of the law of the habitual residence of the characteristic performer of the contract for different 
categories of contracts. 
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(F) Conclusion to Section III 
 
The choice of law rules set out in the Rome II Regulation can be justified and will, in most cases, 
point towards the law of closest connection. The recognition of party autonomy and the rule in 
favour of the law of common habitual residence are not concerned with identifying the centre of 
gravity of the case, but there are persuasive practical reasons underlying these rules.  
 Although there is much to support about Article 10, there remain a few problems. In view 
of the uncertainty of the scope of restitution and the unjust enrichment principle under domestic 
law, the main concern for common lawyers may be how claims for restitution for wrongs and 
proprietary restitution can be dealt with at the choice of law level. These topics deserve separate 
papers in their own right and therefore only a brief discussion can be offered below. In particular, 
how such claims fit within Article 10 of the Rome II Regulation will be considered. A related 
issue, that of renvoi and unjust enrichment, will also be looked at. 
  
IV. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS 
 
(A) Restitution for wrongs 
 
Restitution for wrongs raises fraught choice of law problems. Not everyone agrees that this 
category is based on the principle of reversing unjust enrichment186 and therefore whether such 
claims should be characterised as unjust enrichment for conflicts of law purposes and governed 
by the unjust enrichment choice of law rules is unclear. Having said that, some equitable wrongs 
have been characterised as being restitutionary and governed by the unjust enrichment choice of 
law rule. In El Ajou v. Dollar Land Holdings Millett J. stated that a knowing receipt claim is the 
                                                 
186 Virgo, n 16 above, pp. 425-428; Birks, n 16 above, pp. 12-16, 74; Edelman, n 16 above, pp. 34, 36, 41. 
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‘counterpart in equity of the common law action for money had and received. Both can be 
classified as receipt-based restitutionary claims.’187 His Lordship thought, obiter, that Dicey, 
Morris and Collins’s now Rule 230(2)(c)188 would be applicable to knowing receipt claims i.e. 
the law of the country where the defendant received the money. Sub-rule (2)(c) has also been 
considered in other knowing receipt cases such as Trustor v. Smallbone.189 In Berry Trade Ltd v. 
Moussavi,190 the defendant had ‘laid his hands’ on the claimant’s goods. This was held to concern 
liability for usurpation under Iranian law which was recognised as being broadly analogous to the 
English tort of conversion or unlawful interference with goods. However, Cooke J. accepted that 
if there had not been a tort, the claim would be governed by the law of place of receipt of 
proceeds, that is, Canada and England, on the basis of application of sub-rule (2)(c).191 The 
obligation to pay over bribes or misappropriated money received in breach of fiduciary duty has 
also been held to be governed by sub-rule (2)(c).192 Similarly, in Kuwait Oil Tanker v. Al Bader 
(No. 3),193 Moore-Bick J. applied sub-rule (2)(c) to derive the proper law of the relationship 
between parties when it was claimed that the defendants, who were members of the senior 
management of the claimant company, were unjustly enriched when they breached their duties of 
good faith and honesty by conspiring to steal money from the claimant.194 In Douglas v. Hello! 
                                                 
187 [1993] 3 All ER 717 at 736. See also Grupo Torras SA v. Al-Sabah [2001] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 36 at para. 
122. 
188 Then Rule 203(2)(c), (11th edition, 1987). 
189 [2000] EWCA Civ 150 (9/5/2000). 
190 [2004] EWHC 49. 
191 Ibid., para. 64. This alternative liability would be based on Articles 301 and 303 of the Civil Code of 
Iran (set out in para. 7 of the judgment). The principles elucidated therein appear to be analogous to a 
‘knowing receipt’ claim.  
192 Kartika Ratna Thahir v. PT Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara (Pertamina) [1994] 3 SLR 
257; Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp Ltd v. United Overseas Bank Ltd [1992] 2 SLR 495.  
193 [2000] 2 All ER Comm 271 (CA). 
194 Cf. Base Metal Trading Ltd v. Shamurin [2004] EWCA Civ 1316, [2005] 1 WLR 1157, [2005] 1 All ER 
(Comm) 17, where the Court of Appeal applied the law of place of incorporation of the company for the 
breach of an equitable duty of care owed by a company director. For a commentary of this case, see Yeo, 
‘Choice of Law for Director’s Equitable Duty of Care and Concurrence’ [2005] LMCLQ 144. 
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Ltd (No. 6),195 the Court of Appeal characterised a breach of confidence claim as being 
restitutionary and governed by the law of the country where the enrichment occurred.196 
Although the above cases seem to indicate that the law of the place of enrichment should 
be applicable in wrongs-based restitutionary claims, Collins J. concluded after an extensive 
review of case law in this area that the authorities in favour of Rule 230(2)(c) were weak.197 In 
fact, there are those who persuasively argue that restitution for wrongs should not be 
characterised as restitution or unjust enrichment. The causative event is the wrong so 
characterisation should instead be carried out in accordance with the underlying wrong even if the 
remedy is gain-based.198 So for example, an account of profits for the commission of a tort should 
be governed by the choice of law rules for tort.199 If restitutionary damages are awarded for 
breach of contract then the claim should be characterised as being contractual in nature and 
governed by the contractual choice of law rules.200  
In the field of equitable wrongs, Yeo’s important thesis fleshes out this approach of 
characterising in accordance with the wrong. First of all, he convincingly argues zthat the 
distinction between law and equity is not relevant for choice of law purposes.201 This means that 
equitable claims should be treated in a similar manner as all other legal claims and that any 
domestic classifications as to the nature of a claim only become relevant once the law of that 
particular country is pin-pointed to by the relevant choice of law rule. He then argues that claims 
that would be equitable wrongs under English law or analogous to equitable wrongs under 
English law should be characterised under the main choice of law categories like contract, tort, 
                                                 
195 [2006] QB 125. 
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property or restitution.202 For example, if there is a breach of fiduciary duties arising from a 
contract, then the claim should be characterised as being contractual and governed by the 
governing law of the contract.203 If the duty arises from a consensual relationship not amounting 
to a contract, then by analogy the claim should still be characterised as being contractual.204 If the 
wrong is committed by a third party assisting in a breach of trust or fiduciary duty, the claim to 
reverse unjust enrichment should be characterised as tortious and governed by the law governing 
the tort.205  
 Some of the above propositions can be fitted within the structure of Article 10.206 A claim 
for restitutionary damages for breach of contract, if not characterised as being contractual in the 
first place, would still be governed by the governing law of the contract under Article 10(1). The 
same would happen for a claim for breach of fiduciary duties. In all other cases, Article 10(4) will 
have to be relied upon, if possible, to achieve the same result as would have occurred if the claim 
had been characterised in accordance with the underlying wrong.  
 
(B) Proprietary restitution 
 
It has been seen above that it is unclear whether civil law systems have a form of proprietary 
restitution and that English domestic law has not settled the question of whether such claims are 
based on unjust enrichment. Constructions such as the constructive trust however are 
acknowledged to arise from unjust enrichment in certain circumstances in common law 
                                                 
202 Ibid., Chapter 8. 
203 Ibid., p. 234. See Rickshaw Investments Ltd v. Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 Sing LR 377.  
204 Ibid., p. 320. Cf. P Millet (in the context of domestic law) : ‘…it is misleading, and potentially 
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205 N 46 above, p. 320. In Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim (No. 9), The Times, October 11, 1994, Chadwick 
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jurisdictions like the US and Canada so it is necessary to determine how claims for proprietary 
restitution will be dealt with, if at all, under the Rome II Regulation.207  
The first question must be whether such claims even fall within the scope of the Rome II 
Regulation. One might assume that since the Regulation is phrased in terms of non-contractual 
obligations, the natural meaning would be that its scope is limited to claims requesting personal 
remedies and would not cover claims requesting proprietary remedies. In fact, Article 1(2)(e) 
specifically excludes obligations arising from express trusts from the Regulation’s scope. The 
initial draft of Article 1(2)(e) was more ambiguous and raised the question whether the exclusion 
covered claims arising from a resulting or constructive trust.208 In her Report, Wallis suggested a 
change of terminology from the Commission’s initial draft of Article 1(2)(e) ‘to avoid difficulty 
or confusion arising from the employment of the trust in common-law jurisdictions as a device 
for dealing with situations such as unjust enrichment.’209 The Commission said that it accepted 
the principle of the amendment although it preferred to adopt the wording of the Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition of 1 July 1985 instead of 
the phrasing suggested by Wallis.210 The Hague Trusts Convention covers choice of law rules for 
express trusts211 and therefore it is clear that obligations arising out of express trusts do not fall 
within the scope of the Rome II Regulation. However, it is less clear what is meant to fall within 
the scope of the Regulation by the change of terminology of Article 1(2)(e). Use of the trust as an 
unjust enrichment ‘device’ in the common law could be construed in two ways. On the one hand, 
there is the concept of a ‘constructive trusteeship’ which denotes the personal liability of a 
wrongdoer to account for losses caused to the principal or profits obtained from abusing a 
fiduciary position. Claims alleging a ‘constructive trusteeship’ have been held to fall within Rule 
                                                 
207 It does not matter if the law specified by the Regulation is not the law of a Member State : Article 3. 
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230 of Dicey, Morris and Collins.212 On the other hand, there are the proprietary constructions of 
a resulting and constructive trust which some also think arise in response to unjust enrichment.213 
Which of the two (or is it both) is intended to fall within the scope of the Rome II Regulation? 
The former notion of ‘constructive trusteeship’ would be an example of restitution for 
wrongs and should be dealt with as discussed above. The latter involves proprietary restitution. It 
is suggested that claims for proprietary restitution should really be classified as being proprietary 
in nature and not restitutionary or for the reversal of unjust enrichment.214 This is because claims 
that property is held on a constructive or resulting trust are ultimately proprietary actions even if 
the cause of action is framed in terms of unjust enrichment. The claimant is pursuing an in rem 
claim when asserting beneficial ownership of the property. Such property cannot form part of the 
defendant’s patrimony and would not be available to the defendant’s creditors. Furthermore, once 
beneficial entitlement is established, the claimant would normally wish to terminate the trust and 
compel the defendant to transfer the property to the claimant, that is, gain absolute ownership of 
the property.215 Therefore, the property choice of law rules should be applicable. 
Having said that, the European Court of Justice has held that a declaration that 
immovable property is held on trust does not relate to a right in rem.216 Coupled with the 
ambiguity over the intention behind the change of terminology of Article 1(2)(e), equitable rights 
such as being a beneficiary under a trust, which common lawyers would classify as being 
proprietary, may well be interpreted as being personal in nature and hence fall under the 
Regulation and within the scope of Article 10. If this happens, the choice of law rules therein 
should be used so as to simulate the result that would be achieved if the claim had been classified 
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as being proprietary. Insofar as the claim involves title to land and tangible movables,217 a 
proprietary characterisation would lead towards application of the lex situs. Under Article 10(3), 
the law of the place of enrichment would probably be synonymous with the lex situs.218 An 
argument has been made earlier that it might be possible to regard Article 10(1) as pointing 
towards the lex situs too.219 In cases where the same law does not end up being applied under an 
unjust enrichment characterisation as under a proprietary characterisation, recourse could be had 
to Article 10(4).  
The foremost reasons for the lex situs rule when questions of title are concerned are 
practicality and control : the courts of the situs have the greatest interest and ultimate power in 
regulating how property within its jurisdiction is transferred.220 These justifications have the 
greatest force when land is concerned. However, it is important not to conflate claims in which 
title is affected with personal claims for restitution which are concerned in some way with land. 
The latter is also sometimes suggested to be governed by the lex situs. For example, Dicey, 
Morris and Collins’s Rule 230(2)(b) states that if the obligation to restore the benefit of an 
enrichment obtained at another person’s expense arises in connection with a transaction 
concerning land, the lex situs should be applied.221 It is clear from their citation222 of Batthyany v. 
Walford223 that this rule would cover personal obligations arising in connection with ownership of 
land. Thus, for example, a claim for the value of improvements made to someone else’s land 
would fall under the scope of this sub-rule. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws also 
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lists the situs of a physical thing, particularly land, as a contact pointing towards the law of the 
state which has the most significant relationship to an action for restitution.224 However, the 
commentary notes that : ‘There are still other contacts to be considered. Normally, the physical 
thing will have been located in the state where either the enrichment was received or the 
benefiting act was done.’225 This indicates that the lex situs is not in and of itself the preferred 
choice of law rule with respect to unjust enrichment claims concerning land. This seems sensible 
as while there may be a good basis to apply the lex situs to claims involving assertions of title, as 
would be the situation in cases of proprietary restitution, it is more questionable whether the same 
choice of law rule should be applicable when the issue at stake concerns a mere personal 
obligation. Ruritanian law does not have a special interest in whether A is entitled to be 
remunerated for improving B’s house, just because the house is situated in Ruritania. Neither 
would a Ruritanian court justifiably be offended if another law decides whether A gets 
remunerated. Just because land is involved should not entail a knee-jerk reaction that application 
of the lex situs is paramount. This applies a fortiori when the property in question is a movable. 
Although it may be possible to manipulate Article 10 satisfactorily to deal with claims for 
proprietary restitution, two potential problems arise. First is Article 14 whereby parties are given 
the autonomy to choose the law governing the non-contractual obligation. Article 14 prevails over 
Article 10. In proprietary claims however, it is inappropriate for parties to be able to choose the 
applicable law governing their claim for the reasons of practicality and control mentioned above, 
especially if title to land is concerned.226 The policy reasons which may arise when proprietary 
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restitution is concerned are not catered for by the Rome II Regulation.227 The second problem 
concerns renvoi and is considered next. 
 
(C) Renvoi 
 
This is not the place for an extensive review of the strengths and weaknesses of the doctrine of 
renvoi228 but merely a brief examination of its applicability to unjust enrichment claims. 
The German EGBGB accepts the principle of renvoi229 apart from choice of law in 
contract230 and instances where the parties have exercised their autonomy to choose the applicable 
law.231 In these situations, the applicable law is construed as its internal law. This has the result 
that if the unjust enrichment claim arises from a failed contractual relationship,232 renvoi would 
not apply233 whereas the doctrine may be applicable if the unjust enrichment claim arises from 
some other situation.234  
 Any form of renvoi for unjust enrichment claims is however rejected by the Swiss 
Federal Statute on Private International Law235 and Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.236 
The Rome II Regulation follows this latter approach.237 This position is necessary if the 
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applicable law according to the Regulation were the law of a Member State as circularity would 
otherwise ensue.238 But even if the applicable law were not the law of a Member State, the 
rejection of renvoi in Rome II seems, except in one aspect discussed below, a sensible position to 
take.239 Too often, renvoi is used as an escape device or tool to enable courts to arrive at the result 
which they wish to achieve240 and it is wise to limit this device only to situations where it may 
achieve ‘the policy objectives of the particular choice of law rule’.241  
 Those policy objectives raise their head when one deals with questions of title. If, as may 
be the case, claims for proprietary restitution fall within the scope of the Rome II Regulation, then 
the outright rejection of renvoi in Article 24 is problematic. On the one hand, if such claims were 
characterised as being unjust enrichment claims falling within the scope of the Rome II 
Regulation, renvoi would be excluded. On the other hand, if the claims were classed as being 
proprietary in nature and therefore falling outside the scope of Rome II, renvoi may be applicable. 
If what is at issue is title to land situated abroad, English courts would apply not just the domestic 
law of the lex situs but also its private international law rules.242 If the claim is concerned with 
title to movables situated abroad, the authorities are weaker here but there are suggestions that 
renvoi would also be relevant.243 Thus, claims for proprietary restitution may end up being 
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decided differently depending on whether it is characterised as being a property matter or an 
unjust enrichment matter.244 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
There was concern as to whether unjust enrichment was an appropriate area for inclusion into the 
Rome II Regulation. Article 10 however succeeds on most counts insofar as its choice of law 
rules seek to cover actions based on the unjust enrichment principle. However, the uncertainty 
over the scope and taxonomy of the law of restitution under the common law still poses choice of 
law problems. Specifically, there is the issue of whether restitution for wrongs and proprietary 
restitution fall within the scope of an unjust enrichment choice of law rule. It has been seen that 
the Rome II Regulation does not always lead to the appropriate results if these actions are 
considered to fall within its ambit. If the basis of restitution for wrongs and proprietary restitution 
were conclusively found to be the unjust enrichment principle, the unjust enrichment choice of 
law rules could be re-tooled to accommodate better the inclusion of such claims. However, unless 
and until the issue is settled at the domestic arena, problems will continue to plague at the 
conflicts of law level. 
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